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Part 3: Systemic Risk 
in Ecology and Engineering
everal fields of engineering and science share with
 economics a keen concern with systemic risk. Systemic 
risk is manifested in space shuttle accidents, airplane crashes, 
the collapse of the New Orleans levees, electrical power 
blackouts, and the failures of buildings, bridges, and many 
other engineered systems. Because of these occasional system 
failures, engineers have more relevant data for the study of 
systemic risk than do economists. Using these data to conduct 
retrospective analyses of system problems, engineers have been 
able to identify and remove some sources of failure (for 
example, in aircraft). Similarly, epidemiologists and public 
health experts worry about disease outbreaks and spread, 
which occasionally reach systemic levels, and they have learned 
lessons in risk management by studying past epidemics. 
And ecologists study changes in the state of ecosystems, which 
may receive less press attention but clearly qualify as systemic 
developments because they can result in a true regime shift 
from one equilibrium to another.
There are two ways that one discipline can leverage the 
experience of another. The first way is by adapting method-
ologies developed in one field to analyze structures and 
phenomena in the other field. The examination of the Federal 
Reserve’s Fedwire system in part 4 of this volume exemplifies 
this mode of intellectual sharing: researchers adapt tools from 
outside of economics—namely, network theory and graph 
theory—to learn what insights can be gained by applying them 
to a problem of systemic behavior in the area of payments. The 
second way is by sharing insights that are particular to a given 
field and that, by analogy, might apply to other fields. This is 
the approach taken in this part of the volume. 
Useful Concepts from Ecology 
and Engineering
At the conference, ecologist Simon Levin of Princeton 
University identified a range of concepts that have proved 
helpful in understanding complex systems in ecology and that 
might also apply to financial systems. One useful conceptual 
model of an ecosystem is a “trophic web,” which represents 
how species are interconnected. At a coarse level, a trophic web 
in an ecosystem might be thought of as a set of predator-prey 
relationships. In this case, sets of differential equations can be 
successful in modeling the rise and fall of populations as the 
ecosystem fluctuates around an equilibrium or becomes 
unstable. More generally, however, “trophic” refers to the flow 
of energy, so the trophic web for an ecosystem is a framework 
for representing how the primary source of nutrition (say, 
sunlight or geothermal vents) is transmitted between levels in 
the food chain. This interpretation of the trophic web is more 
applicable to financial systems, in which the interactions are 
usually less extreme than those in predator-prey relationships; 
we simply have to interpret “energy” as anything of value that 
is transmitted through the system. Because of this analogy, it is 
not surprising that we would find similar, if not identical, 
phenomena in these two systems, and therefore similar insights 
might be brought to bear in analyzing them. Complex systems 
of any sort are characterized by nonlinearities, multiple stable 
states, hysteresis, contagion, and synchrony, all of which have 
relevance to the problem of systemic risk.
Nonlinear relationships are a key characteristic of virtually 
any complex system. They can lead to multiple stable states, 
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such that the system can exist in one configuration (basin 
of attraction) for a period of time but then be knocked into 
a different configuration by a perturbation or shock. This 
transition can be accompanied by hysteresis, meaning that if 
the system is to return to its original configuration, it must take 
a different path. Often, pain and other costs are associated with 
that recovery pathway. 
Nonlinear feedbacks, which can be either positive or 
negative, can drive a complex system away from a given 
equilibrium state;1 the stability of any complex system is 
determined by the nature of these feedbacks. Feedbacks can 
result from the low-level processes in the system (for example, 
the behaviors or individuals in a food chain, traders in a 
market, or components of an engineered system), from an 
explicit top-down control system, or from policies enforced 
by regulators. Positive feedbacks usually amplify the effect of 
disturbances, thereby decreasing the stability of steady states. 
In contrast, we usually think of negative feedbacks as 
stabilizing. However, that is not always the case, as demon-
strated by the suspension bridge over the Tacoma Narrows 
known as “Galloping Gertie.” The bridge was subject to a 
negative feedback (a damping) that overcompensated, with 
the result that a certain wind condition led to escalating 
oscillations and finally collapse. 
Once a system is destabilized, it moves away from the linear 
regime and can experience nonlinear behaviors such as path 
dependence (meaning that the next state is dependent on the 
sequence of events that led to it), sustained oscillations (such as 
cyclicality in the financial sector), and regime shifts, by which a 
system moves into an entirely different region of performance, 
such as the less desirable equilibrium that characterized the 
Great Depression. However, nonlinear behavior also means 
that an effective remedy need not require a massive effort, just 
a well-targeted one. 
Another phenomenon common to complex systems is 
contagion. In ecosystems, contagion is an important part of 
ecological and epidemiological dynamics, as exemplified by the 
mechanisms that spread forest fires and disease. In the financial 
1“State” is used here as a shorthand to mean either a single state or a set 
of dynamically (possibly stochastically) related states in a common basin 
of attraction, not something static.
sector, contagion manifests itself as cascading losses and 
increased risk aversion, with the latter leading to herd behavior, 
funding withdrawals, and a contraction of liquidity. Contagion 
can be found in two forms in the electric power grid and other 
complex networks such as road and communications systems. 
A destabilizing form occurs when the failure of one node (for 
example, a substation or a bridge) creates a buildup of load on 
the rest of the system that in turn may lead to a cascade of other 
failures. But when load switching and rebalancing can 
effectively redistribute the load, contagion assumes a stabilizing 
form: it spreads the stress and thereby reduces systemic risk.
Synchrony, another feature shared by some complex 
systems, is evident when incentives or pressures lead individual 
actors to fall into step and make similar choices. In nature, one 
finds benign instances of this phenomenon: some species of 
fireflies blink synchronously, and flocks of birds and schools 
of fish can often turn almost as units. However, tight linkages 
among individuals can also be a cause for concern because they 
can induce systemic collapse. Conservation biologists have 
shown considerable interest in the degree of synchrony in 
species populations: In unsynchronized populations, some 
individuals thrive while others are in decline; in synchronized 
populations, a collapse in one place translates into a collapse 
in all places. Like contagion, synchrony can lead to systemic 
risk in the form of a system failure or a sudden jump to a less 
desirable equilibrium.
Ecosystems, the financial system, and many other complex 
systems are in fact complex adaptive systems, in which 
collective behaviors emerge from individual actions. In 
ecosystems, those collective behaviors include the flocking 
of birds, herding of ruminants, and formation of fish schools. 
In the world of finance, the Dow Jones Index reflects the 
integrated effects of many individual decisions, making it an 
emergent indicator. Many components of the financial system 
pay attention to these emergent indicators, and what the 
indicators imply about collective behaviors feeds back to affect 
individual behavior, but on very different scales of organization 
and time. Behavioral ecologists have developed some under-
standing of the principles of collective decision making among 
animals.2
Complex adaptive systems consist of heterogeneous 
collections of individual units that interact with one another 
and thereby influence how the whole system evolves. Often 
the phenomena that we are interested in are occurring on 
different scales, and the systems essentially integrate 
phenomena at multiple scales of space, time, and complexity. 
The components of the electric power grid (transformers, 
voltage regulators, generators, relay switches, and so forth), 
for instance, are nonlinear and have different stochastic 
2See, for example, Couzin et al. (2005). 
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behaviors that might affect only a local neighborhood of the 
grid, but they interact in ways that can lead to systemic shifts in 
grid performance, or to failure. Moreover, the observed system 
performance is actually the integrated result of the grid’s 
behavior along with the behavior of layers of communication, 
sensing, and control, the fuel supply, human behavior, and 
the financial transactions that make it function. Clearly, 
understanding and predicting the performance of a complex 
adaptive system at that level is a major multiscale and 
multidisciplinary endeavor. 
The term “complex adaptive system” might leave the 
impression that the system is adapting and adjusting itself to 
beneficial effect. What it really means, however, is that some 
components of the system are adapting and changing, not that 
the system as a whole is changing in a coordinated way. The 
adaptation might be in the influenza virus, and its ability to 
become more effective is not necessarily good for the system 
as a whole. 
A critical attribute of complex adaptive systems that must be 
properly modeled is path dependence. Imagine rolling a ball 
down the side of a mountain range. Its path illustrates the 
natural development of a system. The ball comes to certain 
decision points where it enters one or another watershed. Once 
it starts down one path, it is locked into that pathway unless a 
major perturbation occurs. Thus, the future development of 
the system is dependent on the path that has been taken—that 
is, on the history of the system. If there is a major perturbation, 
however, the system can jump into a new basin of attraction 
that is conceptually and phenomenologically very different: the 
system would move from one valley to another.3 This is a 
regime shift, or system flip, which can be very disruptive. For 
example, scientists studying ecological systems worry about 
eutrophication, the over-enrichment of lakes. A system that 
moves from a healthy oligotrophic lake to a eutrophic lake with 
large quantities of algae is still a stable system, but the flip is 
very detrimental for most of the species in the oligotrophic 
lake. Analogously, a rich land can undergo desertification 
and become a very different ecosystem. 
On a larger scale, ocean circulation patterns can undergo 
relatively sudden flips. Such flips have occurred in the past and 
might be triggered again by climate change, but no one knows 
the likelihood of their recurrence. A qualitative change in ocean 
circulation patterns—one that altered the topology of the 
flows—would have major impacts. It would be a regime shift, 
a shift into a different domain of attraction. Economic markets 
can go through crashes and recoveries that are also shifts in the 
basins of attraction. Bank collapses can trigger chain reactions 
that would represent the same type of shift as a phase transition 
in physics.
3In economic terms, each valley will have its own rates of saving, interest, 
employment, productivity, and so forth.
As noted earlier, regime shifts can lead to hysteresis, 
meaning that the behavior of the system in its recovery phase 
may be quite different from its behavior in the destruction 
phase. For example, in the ecological literature, there is 
considerable interest in the spruce bugworm and other 
defoliating insects that can completely denude forests of 
spruce, balsam fir, and other species. After an outbreak of these 
insects, the system recovers over time, but as the forest quality 
increases, the bugworm population builds up enough to 
re-emerge. Once this outbreak occurs, the quality of the forest 
begins to decline until the system reaches a critical point and 
collapses. Thus, the system goes through regular periods of 
outbreak and collapse, each one representing what amounts to 
a system shift. The fact that the pathway on the way down 
differs from the pathway on the way up is a hysteresis effect.
Levin pointed out that, unlike systems designed for 
robustness, complex adaptive systems are systems in which 
whatever robustness exists has to emerge from the collective 
properties of the individual units that make up the system; 
there is no planner or manager whose decisions completely 
control the system. Therefore, there are no guarantees that 
things will work well. This leads us to the problem of the global 
commons, in which we all engage in behaviors based on our 
own agendas and interests; from these individual behaviors, 
system properties emerge. For individual organisms, natural 
selection encourages the development of robust physiological 
properties. But an ecosystem, banking system, or economic 
system has not been engineered for robustness. 
Collapse in complex adaptive systems is the same as the loss 
of robustness. If a system is working well, we think of it as 
robust, whether it is an engineered system, a banking system, or 
an ecosystem. In various literatures, the terms robustness, 
resilience, rigidity, and resistance are often used to mean the 
same thing, although they really describe different components 
of the system’s capacity to function in the presence of internal 
or external disturbances.
What leads to robustness in complex adaptive systems? 
There are at least two ways in which a system can be robust in 
the face of disturbances: by having a rigid design and reliable 
components, or by having a flexible design that may also 
include replaceable components. One can see these alternatives 
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in a stressful marine environment with strong currents. Corals 
resist the disturbances by being rigid, while kelp withstands the 
disturbances by being flexible. These are two quite different 
strategies for responding to the stress of strong currents, and we 
see the same contrasting strategies in many other systems. 
Rigidity—sticking with an existing design or decision (think of 
the Polaroid company and its camera design)—might be the 
best approach over short periods of time or if the environment 
is relatively constant. But over longer periods of time or in 
fluctuating environments, flexibility can prove a more robust 
approach. In the camera industry, for example, Kodak has 
continued to change its camera designs and products over the 
years. Neither the Polaroid nor the Kodak strategy is “right” 
per se, but each is right over a particular time horizon. 
In changing environments, one needs flexibility, whether it 
is in ecological systems or in banking systems. For example, 
Levin noted that the flexibility of the influenza virus accounts 
for its robustness. On the surface of the virus are proteins 
called surface antigens, in particular haemagglutinin and 
neuraminidase. The name of a flu strain—say, H5N1 flu—
refers to the particular forms of haemagglutinin and 
neuraminidase associated with that strain, as those proteins 
change over time. Once a person gets a particular strain of 
influenza, he or she will never get it again. Individual variants 
therefore are not very robust; they can be controlled or 
eradicated by the human immune system if they return. But the 
influenza virus itself has been around for centuries, maybe 
millennia, so the virus seen more generally is very robust. It 
survives because it is adaptive, continually changing its design 
and its surface proteins.
Therefore, according to Levin, for a system to be robust it 
must have diversity—analogous to the way the influenza virus 
is really a family of viruses with variations in their surface 
proteins—and it must have heterogeneity, so that there is scope 
for adaptation in the system. For this reason, ecologists attach 
great importance to biological diversity: even if they do not 
know what particular species do, the presence of diversity 
provides a form of insurance. When a system is too 
homogeneous, it cannot adapt.
Modularity—the degree to which a system can be decoupled 
into discrete components—also influences robustness. A basic 
principle in the management of forest fires and epidemics is 
that if systems are all connected, a perturbation will encounter 
nothing to stop it from spreading. But when a system is 
compartmentalized (when firebreaks exist or high-risk parts 
of a population are vaccinated against an epidemic), then the 
spread may be contained. Modularity can thus be an important 
part of robustness if it ensures that an affected component will 
be isolated from destabilizing feedbacks. However, modularity 
often involves a trade-off between local and systemic risk. 
Because the compartmentalized elements of a system will be 
less able to withstand some shocks, modularity tends to 
increase the risk that individual elements will be critically 
damaged. Although the sacrifice of such elements is assumed to 
decrease the risk of a calamitous systemic failure, the wrong 
compartmentalization in financial markets could preclude 
stabilizing feedbacks, such as mechanisms for replacing lost 
liquidity, and so could actually increase systemic risk.
Robustness is not the same as stability, which refers to 
the ability of a system to return to its equilibrium state. 
It is interesting to note that ecologists have not been able to 
agree on the relationship between biodiversity and stability. 
In the 1950s, qualitative arguments led many to believe that 
biodiversity and stability are positively correlated—for 
instance, that biodiversity leads to robustness in some 
macroscopic system properties such as nutrient cycling. But 
theoretical arguments developed in the 1970s implied that as 
system complexity or diversity increases, an equilibrium in the 
relevant system of differential equations is less likely to be 
asymptotically stable. Some argue that the instability of the 
system dynamics (in the narrow sense of a stable equilibrium 
of species densities) is what provides the adaptive capacity to 
buffer the macroscopic properties: species replace one another, 
or there are shifts in abundance, and these changes allow the 
system to adapt to perturbations. Whether diversity increases 
or decreases stability is an argument over the definition of 
stability, and it is still being debated.4 
The lesson that might be inferred is that understanding the 
behavior of complex adaptive systems requires more than just 
qualitative analysis and more than just theory. Ecologists have 
applied alternative mathematical frameworks (for example, 
interacting particle systems or systems of differential 
equations), intensive simulations, data-driven analyses, and 
even experiments in the effort to resolve this issue, and a similar 
multifaceted effort might be needed to provide policymakers 
with insights about the root sources of stability in financial 
systems.
4See National Research Council (2005, pp. 114-5) for a good discussion of this 
debate. See also Levin (2000, chap. 7).
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Methodologies for Prediction 
and Management
In addition to providing useful concepts for the description 
and analysis of systems in other disciplines, science and 
engineering may provide some relevant methodologies for the 
prediction and management of systemic risk. The rich scientific 
literature on networks and graph theory, for example, may 
have some bearing on the management of economic and 
financial system risk. Networks influence the spread of 
information, disease, and disturbances, and indeed the spread 
of effects that can stabilize or destabilize a system. The topology 
of the network is one of the key factors to study. For instance, 
are there key nodes in the network whose removal would cause 
the system to become decoupled? The potential for decoupling 
might be seen as a vulnerability of the system because it could 
impair the functioning of the network, but it can also suggest a 
mode for limiting contagion in that it induces the modularity 
that is important to robustness. Thus, to control the spread of 
disease, scientists try to identify those who are super spreaders, 
the individuals (say, prostitutes or hospital workers) who 
connect different groups and make the system more likely 
to exhibit undesirable synchronous effects. More generally, 
researchers who study the topology of networks and the 
relationship of that structure to network functionality will 
consider how the properties of the network affect the spread 
of money, disease, or information and propagate the spread of 
disturbances that can cause systems to collapse. 
Other scientific research relevant to the management of risk 
is the literature on the modeling and control of forest fires, the 
modeling and management of epidemics, and contagious 
spread more broadly. The whole field of spatial stochastic 
processes has focused largely on ecological and epidemiological 
problems. As an example, Levin cited a National Institutes of 
Health committee he recently chaired that oversaw several 
agent-based simulations of the potential spread of pandemic 
influenza in order to identify strategies for controlling that 
spread. The models developed in this and other research efforts 
are very computation-intensive. Levin indicated that 
transferring the techniques from these models to the study 
of financial systems would not be difficult, both because the 
parallels were strong and because researchers in the financial 
sector would be comfortable with the mathematical 
techniques. The rich literature of epidemic theory, both 
mathematical and computational, might then be applicable to 
understanding runs on banks, as long as this approach was 
properly augmented with knowledge of human behaviors that 
contribute specifically to bank contagion. Levin suggested that 
it might also be possible to transfer recent work on social 
learning to the study of the financial sector.
George Sugihara of the University of California at San Diego 
expanded on the possibility of rich analogies between 
ecosystems and financial systems. Perfect parallelism is not 
required if the goal is merely to stimulate fresh thinking that 
generates productive hypotheses for research and even policy 
formation related to financial systems, although empirical 
corroboration of the analogy is, of course, one way to 
strengthen its utility.
He pointed out that most ecosystems are innately robust 
because they are survivors of extreme stress testing. Their 
existence today sets them apart as the selected survivors of 
many millions of years of upheaval and perturbation, having 
withstood continental drift, meteor extinctions, climate 
fluctuations, and the introduction or evolution of new 
members. Those that survive show some remarkable constancy 
in structure that may persist for hundreds of millions of years 
(for example, the constancy of predator/prey ratios noted in 
Baumbach, Knoll, and Sepkowski [2002]). Identifying the 
common attributes of these diverse systems that have survived 
rare systemic events could provide clues about which 
characteristics of complex adaptive systems correlate with a 
high degree of robustness. These attributes could then be 
examined as candidate characteristics for lessening systemic 
risk in other contexts, such as the financial sector. Because 
experimental stress testing is not feasible in the financial sector, 
examining such common structural properties of ecosystems 
should be of interest, and it might help guide policy. 
According to Sugihara, recent studies in nonlinear complex 
systems show rapid and large transitions in state to be common 
features of many “generic” interconnected dynamic (and 
cybernetic) systems. Beyond the specific analogy between 
ecology and economics, certain dynamical behaviors and 
structural (topological) constraints are common to broad 
classes of systems. Behaviors and network topologies that are 
truly generic—as opposed to system-specific—can inform 
many disciplines. For example, to understand the systemic risk 
problem, it is useful to know the general properties of complex 
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systems, particularly the structural ones that promote stability 
or collapse.
As an example of scientific analysis that can readily be 
applied to financial systems, Sugihara cited a recent paper in 
Science (Bascompte, Jordano, and Olesen 2006) that examined 
disassortative networks—networks in which nodes that are in 
some sense “large” connect with many nodes that are “small,” 
although the small nodes do not connect to many large nodes. 
The paper, coming from the field of ecology, focused on the 
network of pollinators and the plants that they pollinate, but 
it also dealt more broadly with all networks that are positively 
reinforcing. The paper showed that the disassortative nature of 
the pollinator-plant network conveys a great deal of stability—
a result, Sugihara suggested, that generalizes to any type of 
disassortative network, including the network linking U.S. 
banks to the Fedwire system (see part 4 of this volume). In this 
case, then, the theoretical analysis of a complex ecological 
system highlights a characteristic of the financial system that 
might be essential for stability and therefore worthy of 
protection. 
Risk Assessment of Extreme Events 
Involving National Security 
Yacov Haimes of the University of Virginia discussed his 
work in modeling extreme events, especially those that affect 
interconnected infrastructures and relate to national security. 
It is generally impossible to build one single model to 
represent any such complex system; there are too many 
cross-cuts and too many ways to examine the processes and 
effects of a complex system. The analysis of such a system 
must instead be addressed from multiple perspectives, 
perhaps hierarchically. 
For his approach, Haimes has developed what he calls 
“hierarchical holograph modeling” (HHM). This method is 
hierarchical because it includes many different subtopics, 
such as hardware, software, and organizational influences. 
He emphasized that the last subtopic must be included in any 
study of risk because many of the factors that contribute to risk, 
or follow from extreme events, are organizational problems 
and human problems. Risk analysis must consider such 
matters as how well lines of communication function, how 
much trust exists within a system, and who can share 
information in a timely and effective way. And, of course, 
the modern reliance on information technology means that 
information assurance has also become critical. Haimes calls 
his method “holographic” because it examines risk from many 
different perspectives. For example, in a study conducted 
for the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Haimes and his colleagues identified 300 major 
sources of risk to the U.S. water supply. A good methodology is 
necessary to structure an analysis encompassing that quantity 
of information.
This approach to identifying and analyzing extreme events 
in engineering differs from the approach often used in 
modeling extreme events in economics and finance. The HHM 
method starts with an extreme outcome and provides a 
methodology for exploring what factor or combination of 
factors would produce that outcome. It is an inverse method 
in that it works backward from an undesirable outcome to 
infer what combinations of circumstances could give that result 
and what the associated probabilities are. In contrast, systemic 
risk analyses as conducted by financial economists or market 
practitioners often project forward to infer the ramifications 
of a hypothesized shock. The two approaches represent 
different strategies for understanding what factors produce 
extreme events. 
In the study for the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, Haimes and his colleagues used 
HHM as the foundation of an adaptive multiplayer game. 
Four teams, each with a very different perspective, were 
assembled in 2005 to develop separate HHMs to learn about 
the various sources of risk affecting Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The red team 
assumed the perspectives of attackers and hackers; the blue 
team represented the perspectives of SCADA operators and 
owners; a vendor team embodied the ideas of SCADA 
developers and vendors; and a policymaker/stakeholder team 
represented the interests of government and of industry 
associations. About sixty experts participated in the four teams. 
Interestingly, because of the teams’ differing perspectives, there 
was less than 10 percent overlap in the specific risks identified. 
For instance, several teams identified software and staff 
training as key risks, but only the policymaker team identified 
organizational decision making as a potential risk, and only 
the operators/owners team identified the quality of electrical 
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infrastructure as a potential risk. This exercise underscores 
the value of incorporating multiple views and perspectives in 
efforts to identify sources of risks in complex systems. Team 
approaches to generating input for risk analysis can be very 
effective. The key to their success is the mechanism for 
assimilating the information generated and for anchoring it to 
concrete evidence. Uncertainty quantification plays a major 
role in the degree of success of such efforts. The problem most 
often encountered is that the results are not sufficiently 
transparent to merit high confidence.
Another study of large-scale risk undertaken by Haimes and 
his colleagues explored the regional and national economic 
effects of an attack with a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse 
(H-EMP).5 In an H-EMP attack, an enemy would use a nuclear 
weapon to inflict systemic damage on the country’s electrical 
and computing infrastructure. Specifically, an atomic bomb 
would be exploded fifty kilometers above the United States, 
and most of the damage would be to electronic systems, not 
people or structures. 
Using the inoperability input-output model (an adaptation 
of Wassily Leontief ’s input-output model that puts more 
emphasis on interdependencies), Haimes and his colleagues 
estimated the percentages of dysfunctionality that would be 
observed in 485 sectors of the regional economy as a result of 
an H-EMP attack. These estimates were based on assumptions 
about the impact of the H-EMP blast on the electrical and 
computing infrastructure of each sector. As expected, the 
predicted inoperability effects are not uniform across all 
sectors, nor are the production losses, which would amount to 
billions of dollars. By studying the heterogeneous effects of 
such an event, Haimes explicitly avoids the spatial and sector 
smoothing that is implicit in some analyses of risk, and draws 
attention to the varied and localized nature of the economy’s 
vulnerabilities. In this particular case, it was determined 
that the major impacts sustained by some sectors would 
nevertheless have a minor effect on the economy per se, and so 
would not lead to systemic problems. This type of analysis 
provides policymakers with valuable insights into priorities, 
highlighting what resources should be protected first or most 
securely. It can also help illuminate the trade-offs between 
different recovery strategies, which can be striking.
Presenting another example of a complex analysis of 
heterogeneous impacts, Haimes described his study of the 
hypothetical economic impacts of a closure of the Monitor-
Merrimac and Hampton Roads bridge-tunnels in southeastern 
Virginia. That area of Virginia contains a number of military 
installations, including a major naval base. To understand the 
5This study was conducted for the Congressional Commission on H-EMP 
Attacks on the United States.
economic effects, Haimes had to model the driving patterns of 
many groups of workers and purchasers as they found alternate 
routes, and the patterns emerging from those models 
collectively created a picture of the overall system behavior. 
If these tunnels were destroyed, it would take more than a year 
to rebuild them, so they are very strategic for Virginia and for 
national security more generally. This research provides the 
foundation for choices that prepare us for extreme natural 
hazards or terrorist attacks and for developing resilience in our 
interdependent infrastructure and economic systems. 
An analysis using an inoperability input-output model 
revealed that the major sectors whose functioning would be 
impaired by the closure of the bridge-tunnels would be 
primary metal manufacturing and textile manufacturing. 
All the other sectors would be minimally affected. As for the 
overall economic loss, management services would be affected 
most, followed by business services and retail trade, while 
the economic impact in many other sectors would be slight. 
The analysis shows each sector from different perspectives, 
producing a broader picture. 
In all these risk analyses, Haimes and his colleagues assessed 
the expected value of outcomes but supplemented that 
assessment with other information because expected values 
can be insufficient indicators of risk. Managers and decision 
makers are often more concerned with the risk attaching to a 
specific case than with the likelihood of an “average” adverse 
outcome that may result from all similar risk situations. They 
are also interested both in the low-frequency, high-damage 
events—those with major, potentially regime-shifting 
consequences—and in the more common risks, which 
dominate the expected value. 
Team approaches to generating input for 
risk analysis can be very effective. The key 
to their success is the mechanism for 
assimilating the information generated 
and for anchoring it to concrete evidence. 
Uncertainty quantification plays a major 
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The Trade-Off between the Cost of Risk Management 
and Potential Losses
Haimes explained how he uses the partitioned 
multiobjective risk method (PMRM)6 to measure and analyze 
the risk of extreme and catastrophic events by partitioning the 
probability into several sections, as shown in the following 
equations:
The probabilities displayed in these equations have the 
following interpretations:
￿ f2(·) represents the risk with high probability of 
exceedance7 and low damage, partitioned at β1 on 
the damage axis.
￿ f3(·) represents the risk with median probability of 
exceedance and medium damage, partitioned between 
β1 and β2 on the damage axis.
￿ f4(·) represents the risk with low probability of 
exceedance and high damage, partitioned between 
β2 and ∞  on the damage axis.
￿ f5(·) represents the unconditional (conventional) 
expected value.
The PMRM can be used to explore trade-offs between the 
cost of risk management and the potential loss. The chart 
presents a specific example in which the horizontal axis 
represents a percentage of electric power capacity at risk and 
the vertical axis, which is also f1(·), represents the cost of risk 
management. Each of the policy options A through D has an 
6See Asbeck and Haimes (1984).
7An exceedance probability (EP) curve specifies the probability that a certain 
level of loss will be exceeded. If one views the loss as a random variable, 
the EP is simply the complementary cumulative distribution of the loss.
associated cost for risk management and a corresponding loss 
of functionality. For instance, option A consists of investing 
significant resources in risk management in order to reduce the 
likelihood of extreme events. The curve on the left shows the 
expected value lost, while the curve on the right shows the 
extreme loss. It is the more meaningful curve. 
Prediction and Management of 
Systemic Failure in the Electric Grid
Massoud Amin of the University of Minnesota extended the 
discussion of risk assessment, modeling, and prediction by 
describing past and potential failures in the North American 
electric power grid, another complex system. While this system 
might not support multiple equilibria, as ecosystems and 
financial systems can, it is certainly susceptible to nonlinear 
amplification of instability, which leads to blackouts. The post 
mortem analysis of major blackouts often shows the root cause 
to be the failure of one or a few components (out of thousands 
in the portion of the grid ultimately affected) that upsets an 
equilibrium and leads to a cascade of failures. For example, on 
August 10, 1996, North America experienced a major blackout 
affecting more than 7 million customers in thirteen states or 
provinces. It was later determined that the root cause was two 
transmission faults in Oregon. Ultimately, that modest failure 
led to power oscillations on the order of 500 megawatts, 
overwhelming the system’s response mechanisms and leading 
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Amin reported that some studies of the 1996 blackout 
estimated that it could have been avoided if the grid had 
intelligent controls and was able to reduce its load by 
0.4 percent for thirty minutes. Such studies not only shed light 
on how to prevent future failures, but also help to clarify what 
recovery options exist if a similar failure does occur. Recovery 
is an important part of risk management, and recovery options 
can be identified by doing a scenario-based quantitative risk 
assessment in advance. Of course, the technologies for 
recognizing the incipient problem and tailoring a solution 
are far from obvious.
Engineered systems such as the electric power grid or a 
telecommunications network often include advanced control 
systems that enable recovery. Amin reported on research 
funded in the 1990s by the Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) that built on the technology used in control systems for 
fighter planes. Because a power system includes substations 
and generators that must operate at the same 60 hertz 
frequency, controlling those elements in a coordinated fashion 
is somewhat analogous to controlling planes that are flying 
in formation. And responding to the loss of one or more 
components is somewhat analogous to maintaining control 
of an aircraft when a wing is damaged. Accordingly, EPRI’s 
research was directed toward a control system that would have 
some self-healing capability—a system, in other words, that 
could anticipate disruptive events by detecting signals 
indicating an important change, conduct a real-time 
assessment of the changing state of the system, determine how 
close the system is to some “edge” in performance, and remedy 
or isolate the problem (isolation, sectionalization, and adaptive 
islanding, which are discussed below). These same sorts of 
capabilities would be desirable in a system designed to control 
the financial system during disruptions.
Creating such a control capability for the electric grid 
requires a mixture of tools from dynamical systems, statistical 
physics, and information and communication science, as well 
as research to reduce the computational complexity of the 
algorithms so they can be scaled up to the large size of the 
system being controlled.8 The electric grid poses a multiscale 
challenge: troublesome signals must be detected within 
milliseconds, with certain compensatory actions taken 
automatically; some load balancing and frequency control on 
the grid is handled on a timescale of seconds; and control 
functions such as load forecasting and management or 
generation scheduling take place on a timescale of hours or 
days. Identifying at the atomic level what is amiss in a system 
8Working methods derived from the EPRI research program have been applied 
in a variety of contexts, including the electricity infrastructure coupled with 
telecommunications and the energy markets, cell phone networks on the 
Internet, and some biological systems.
and then responding on a macro-scale requires multiresolution 
modeling in both space and time. 
To convey the complexity of modeling and controlling the 
electric grid, Amin gave some basic facts. In North America, 
there are more than 15,000 generators and 240,000 miles of 
high-voltage lines. The overall grid is divided into several very 
large interconnected regions, and modeling one of them 
(which is necessary for understanding the systemic risks) might 
entail a simulation with 50,000 lines and 3,000 generators. The 
system is typically designed to withstand the loss of any one of 
these elements. To determine whether the grid can attain that 
design goal, we need to simulate the loss of each of the 53,000 
elements and calculate the effects on each of the 50,000 lines, 
leading to more than 2.6 billion cases. Although analysis of 
these systemic risks is very challenging, the findings can help 
researchers determine the best way to operate the system.
As an additional illustration of the level of detail that can be 
successfully simulated, Amin presented a complex model that 
predicts load and demand for DeKalb, Illinois, a sizable market 
with a mixture of commercial and residential customers. 
Deregulation of the electric system has reduced the correlation 
between power flow and demand, thus introducing uncertainty 
into the system, and so a number of researchers have sought 
new ways to monitor and predict demand. The models and 
algorithms are now sophisticated enough to simulate the 
demand by customer type (residential, small commercial, large 
commercial) on an hour-by-hour basis and attain 99.6 to 
99.7 percent accuracy over the entire year. One benefit of these 
predictions is that they enable power companies to dispatch 
small generators to meet anticipated high demand.
More broadly, Amin argued that any critical national 
infrastructure typically has many layers and many decision-
making units and is vulnerable to various disturbances. 
Effective, intelligent, and “distributed control” is required that 
would enable parts of the constituent networks to remain 
In any situation subject to rapid changes, 
completely centralized control requires 
multiple, high-data-rate, two-way 
communication links, a powerful central 
computing facility, and a sophisticated 
operations control center. But all of these 
features are vulnerable to disruption 
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operational or even to reconfigure automatically in the event 
of local failures or threats of failure. In any situation subject 
to rapid changes, completely centralized control requires 
multiple, high-data-rate, two-way communication links, 
a powerful central computing facility, and a sophisticated 
operations control center. But all of these features are 
vulnerable to disruption precisely when they are most needed 
(that is, when the system is stressed by natural disasters, 
purposeful attack, or unusually high demand). 
When failures occur at various locations in such a network, 
the whole system breaks into isolated “islands,” each of which 
must then fend for itself. With the intelligence distributed, and 
the components acting as independent agents, those in each 
island have the ability to reorganize themselves and make 
efficient use of the remaining local resources in order to 
minimize the adverse impact on the overall network. Local 
controllers will guide the isolated areas to operate independ-
ently while preparing them to rejoin the network, without 
creating unacceptable local conditions either during or after 
the transition. A network of local controllers can act as a 
parallel, distributed computer, communicating via microwaves, 
optical cables, or the power lines themselves, and limiting their 
messages to only the information necessary to achieve global 
optimization and facilitate recovery after failure.
If coordinated with the internal structure existing in a 
complex infrastructure and with the physics specific to the 
components they control, these agents promise to provide 
effective local oversight and control without need of excessive 
communications, supervision, or initial programming. Indeed, 
they can be used even if human understanding of the complex 
system in question is incomplete. These agents exist in every 
local subsystem and perform programmed self-healing actions 
that can avert a larger failure. Such simple agents are already 
embedded in many systems today in the form of circuit 
breakers and fuses as well as diagnostic routines. Echoing the 
familiar tale of the kingdom that was lost for want of a 
horseshoe nail, we might say that these agents are like the 
missing nail: once restored, they can save an entire kingdom.
Another key insight relayed by Amin was drawn from the 
analysis of forest fires. Researchers in one of the six EPRI-
funded consortia found these fires to have “failure-cascade” 
behavior similar to that of electric power grids. In a forest fire, 
the transformation of a spark into a conflagration depends on 
the proximity of the trees to one another. If just one tree in a 
barren field is hit by lightning, it burns but no big blaze results. 
But if there are many trees and they are close together, the 
single lightning strike can result in a forest fire that burns until 
it reaches a natural barrier such as a rocky ridge, river, or road. 
If the barrier is narrow enough that a burning tree can fall 
across it, or if it includes a burnable section, such as a wooden 
bridge, the fire jumps the barrier and burns on. It is the role of 
first-response wild-land firefighters such as smoke jumpers to 
contain a small fire before it spreads by reinforcing an existing 
barrier or scraping out a defensible fire line barrier around the 
original blaze.
Similar outcomes can be observed for failures in electric 
power grids. For power grids, the “one-tree” situation is one 
in which every single electric socket has a dedicated wire 
connecting it to a dedicated generator. A lightning strike on any 
wire would take out that one circuit and no more. But the 
efficient use of resources argues against such a system, and 
instead favors one in which numerous sockets are served by a 
single circuit and there are multiple circuits for each generator. 
A failure anywhere in such a system causes additional failures 
until a barrier—a surge protector or circuit breaker, say—is 
reached. If the barrier does not function properly or is an 
insufficient impediment, the failure bypasses it and continues 
cascading across the system. 
These findings suggest risk management approaches in 
which the natural barriers in power grids may be made more 
robust by simple design changes, or in which small failures 
might be contained by active smoke-jumper-like controllers 
before the failures grow into large problems. Other research 
into the fundamental theory of complex interactive systems is 
exploring methods of quickly detecting weak links and failures 
within a system. Phased risk assessments have been very helpful 
in this regard. That is, experience indicates the value of 
performing “coarse-grained” risk assessments to identify 
important contributors. Rather than considering fifty initiating 
events for crisis scenarios, one might collapse them into five or 
six key events, and then focus on what is most important. 
According to Amin, work over the past nine years in this 
area has led to a new vision for the integrated sensing, 
communications, and control of the power grid. Some of 
the pertinent issues are why and how to develop protection 
and containment devices for centralized as opposed to 
decentralized control and questions involving adaptive 
operation and the resistance to various destabilizers. In 
researching these issues, EPRI has refrained from conducting 
“in vivo” societal tests, which can be disruptive, and has instead 
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performed extensive simulation testing (in silico) of devices 
and policies in the context of the whole system. The EPRI 
simulations have produced a greater understanding of how 
policies, economic designs, and technology might fit into 
the continental grid (while exposing some unintended 
consequences of possible designs and policies), and provided 
guidance on the effective deployment and operation of these 
resources. 
To mitigate the risk of systemic failure, the electric grid can 
be engineered for robustness. Amin presented an example of 
intelligent adaptive “islanding,” which is a method for blocking 
contagion. His results were based on a simulation of a 
hypothetical major blackout similar to the August 1996 
blackout in the western United States. The simulation results 
he displayed captured the steady decay in frequency from 
60 hertz to less than 58 hertz, after which the system would 
have deteriorated into a blackout. This simulation covered 
3.5 seconds of simulated time. Then the simulation was re-run 
with major power lines eliminated between Arizona and 
Southern California to halt the contagion that led to the 
simulated blackout. As a result, the Western Interconnect grid 
was broken into two self-sustaining islands. Amin simulated 
more than 12,000 cases to stress-test the islands, and found that 
they consistently withstood the damaging contagion. With 
intelligent islanding (isolation) shortly after a major system 
disruption, the frequency recovered to close to 60 hertz before 
a blackout could occur. 
This example also illustrates the practice in some 
engineering risk analysis of identifying undesirable outcomes 
first and then developing the fault trees and associated 
probabilities that could lead to those outcomes. The 
engineering community extensively employs both inductive 
reasoning (the event-tree thought process) and deductive 
reasoning (the fault tree) in its risk assessments. The most 
common approach is to use the event tree to structure the 
scenarios and fault trees to quantify the split fractions of 
the event-tree branch points. 
Analogies in Economics and Finance 
Vincent Reinhart of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System commented on three general forms of 
nonlinearity that are important to systemic risk. First, he noted 
that the consequences of events in the financial sector are likely 
nonlinear. Therefore, in designing and enforcing laws and 
regulations, the goal should not be to minimize the probability 
of every adverse event, but to guard against those that have 
more severe consequences: In other words, the risk 
probabilities have to be weighted by some measure of the 
welfare gain that would arise from the prevention of each 
serious adverse event. That is the point of the partitioned 
multiobjective risk method, which—as we saw earlier—is 
designed to measure and analyze the risk of extreme and 
catastrophic events. 
In a second form of nonlinearity, some economic processes 
are self-reinforcing. That is, in the run-up to a crisis, the size or 
transmission of some events may be amplified. Margin calls 
may cause selling that forces prices down more sharply, leading 
to a “fire sale.” Concerns about collateral values or an uncertain 
stock of capital may reduce arbitrage. If intermediaries restrict 
the availability of credit and therefore weaken spending, that 
action becomes the “financial accelerator.” 9 These self-
reinforcing effects are similar to those that can occur in the 
power grid when lightning strikes.
Trading activity can exhibit this second form of 
nonlinearity. Consider a simple model in which two people go 
to a market to trade. The amount of resources that one person 
commits to trading depends on the amount that the other 
person is expected to bring. This situation leads to collective 
decision making, which can be a highly nonlinear process in 
which small changes in cost bring about large changes in 
overall market activity. Indeed, trading could dry up 
altogether. 
The third form of nonlinearity described by Reinhart 
was the dependence of some economic processes on the 
expectations of the players. This dependence can make 
prediction very difficult and implies that there might be 
multiple equilibria. How the market mechanism chooses 
among these equilibrium outcomes may be unclear. As a result, 
randomness and the sequence of events matter, suggesting that 
the way policy decisions are communicated during the run-up 
to a crisis can have an important influence on how the crisis 
9The term “financial accelerator” refers to how endogenous developments in 
credit markets can amplify shocks in an economy. See Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1996).
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plays out. It also means that some techniques from the physical 
sciences are not directly transferable to economic and financial 
risk—the odds on a 100-year storm do not change because 
people think that such a storm has become more likely.
Reinhart also noted that, in a simple economic model, 
positive feedback can be destabilizing. But if one introduces 
an asset that is priced in a forward-looking manner, positive 
feedback is a mechanism for selecting a unique equilibrium. 
In those same models, negative feedback introduces the 
possibility of multiple equilibria—as was well known thirty 
years ago.
Levin observed that, in contrast to management of the 
electric power grid, there are only coarse or indirect options 
for control of the financial system. The tools available to 
policymakers—such as those used by central banks—are 
designed to modify individual incentives and individual 
behaviors in ways that will support the collective good. Such 
top-down efforts to influence individual behaviors can often be 
effective, but it is still difficult to control the spread of panic 
behavior or to manage financial crises in an optimal way. 
Within the financial system, robustness is something that 
emerges; it cannot be engineered. 
Levin also noted that the key determinants of robustness—
diversity and heterogeneity—are the same for biological, 
engineered, and financial systems. The influenza virus is robust 
because it takes on diverse forms; the analogue in the financial 
sector is the variety of institutions and remediation 
mechanisms, which makes the financial system more resistant 
to large-scale failures. In both cases, the system is able to 
adapt to change. But some redundancy—the ability of one 
component to perform another’s function—is, of course, also 
important in these systems. Otherwise, the chance loss of one 
component could be catastrophic.
Discussion
Robert Oliver of the University of California at Berkeley noted 
that both Haimes and Amin had an implicit taxonomy in their 
risk analysis methodology: they first ran a risk assessment 
and then explored risk management. Their talks gave some 
guidelines for carrying out that linear process. However, those 
talks did not illustrate how engineers also turn around risk 
analyses to guide redesigns of system architectures and 
topology and of the policies that are integral to system 
performance. Since that process could be of value to central 
bankers, Oliver asked for comments on how one might reach 
new insights on those design and architectural questions.
Haimes suggested that a good way to proceed is to ask first 
what can go wrong. Looking from many different perspectives 
(as engineer, economist, social scientist, and so forth), one can 
discover some things that have never been expected to go 
wrong. To identify systemic risks, one has to look at everything. 
Since no one can really capture all of the relevant perspectives, 
systemic risks must be assessed through consultations with 
multiple players, which ultimately converge on a picture of the 
most important risks. 
David Levermore of the University of Maryland pointed out 
that large-scale, complex simulations as exemplified by the 
work of Haimes and Amin are only part of the process of 
analyzing systemic risk. In the physical and biological sciences, 
very tiny models, designed to build understanding, also play an 
important role.10 These models are comparable in spirit to the 
work described in part 2 of this volume, with one possible 
distinction: in the physical and biological sciences, researchers 
do not limit themselves to only those simple models that can be 
solved analytically. The simple models might have only three or 
four variables, or sometimes just one complicated nonlinear 
variable, but still be complex enough to preclude analytic 
solution. Thus, research in the physical and biological sciences 
might rely more on computation than is the case in macro-
economics. Some of this research entails large-scale 
computing, but one should also note that studies yielding 
highly significant insights, such as the studies in dynamical 
systems on the logistics map, have been undertaken on very 
simple computers. 
Douglas Gale of New York University observed that in 
helping to identify speakers for the conference, he had looked 
for those who would discuss the theoretical research being 
done on financial stability. This emphasis may have given a 
biased picture of current research in economics. In fact, Gale 
noted, computational economics is a very large part of 
10See, for example, May (2004, pp. 790-3) and Keeling et al. (2003). 
Both papers also illustrate the possible limitations of simple models.
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economics, and economists typically make great use of data, a 
point that was echoed by Reinhart. But an effort to model an 
entire system, with the aim of learning how to control it better, 
is a very large-scale project and one that academic economists 
will not readily take on because of the way the profession is 
organized and financed. They could follow such a path, but it 
would require additional resources. Moreover, Gale expressed 
some doubts about whether a large-scale computational 
approach is the right way to look at a system. Instead, it might 
be more fruitful to divide that system into understandable and 
digestible pieces and then find ways of engineering the system 
to ensure its robustness without a central control. Such an 
undertaking would not require an ability to model the entire 
system, still less an ability to control the full model. 
Sugihara noted that the reliance on simple models, 
abstracted from reality, can sometimes have misleading 
consequences. For instance, the ideal gas laws, which are a 
mainstay of the physical sciences, assume a certain kind of 
functional form that often invites researchers to fit a scattering 
of points to that form. But the reason for the scatter might be 
quite important, and simplistic laws can lead researchers to 
overlook it. In the study of fisheries, understanding the larger 
systemic context of an individual species—the web as opposed 
to the node—is very important. The presentation by Hyun 
Song Shin of Princeton University, Sugihara noted, explicitly 
addressed the web of claims and obligations. As researchers 
and policymakers in finance and economics continue to 
think in those larger terms, they are going to reach a fuller 
understanding of the reality of the problem. Robert 
Litzenberger of Azimuth Trust, however, pointed out the 
value of abstraction in research, citing Milton Friedman’s 
paper on positive economics, which assigns an important role 
to assumptions and modeling. In Friedman’s view, assumption 
allows the economist to abstract from the things that are 
less important in order to focus on the key variables. The 
economist’s model is not meant to offer realistic description, 
which can fail to have predictive power. Simple models can 
provide considerable insight and also produce very useful 
predictions. The ultimate test of an assumption is its 
predictive power.
Rather than choose between the extremes of simple and 
complex models, several conference participants endorsed 
the concept of nested hierarchical models. The collaboration 
between Morten Bech of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, Walter Beyeler and Robert Glass of Sandia National 
Laboratories, and Kimmo Soramäki of the European Central 
Bank, described in part 4 of this volume, is a good example of 
what could be accomplished in that direction. Pursuing the 
notion of combining different types of models, Sugihara 
suggested the following steps to build on the foundations 
laid at the conference:
￿ Devise minimal (simple) models first to see how much 
real variation in the data can be explained. Examples 
might be Shin’s model of leverage, presented in part 2 
of this volume, or agent-based models with simple sets 
of rules. The latter would include models that can 
reproduce certain statistical properties of aggregate price 
series, such as the model proposed by Lux and Marchesi 
(1999). The work in progress by Bech, Beyeler, Glass, 
and Soramäki on an agent-based model for the Fedwire 
payments network is a step in this direction. The 
importance of empirical validation should not be 
overlooked, and the meaning of the topological patterns 
uncovered by Bech and his collaborators needs to be 
understood. There is much to be learned from simple 
models that can elucidate the systemic risk problem at 
the most general level.
￿ Create more complex, mechanistic models to comple-
ment the simpler ones. This task aims for the ideal, 
and it needs to be done carefully and in tandem with 
the simple models. Nonlinearities in functional 
relationships fix the scale of the model mechanisms 
(aggregation problem) and can hinder the applicability 
of those models across different market scales: firm, 
industry, regional, national, and global. The difficulty of 
developing complex models is exemplified by the early 
efforts to develop ecosystem models. These models 
appeared to be very complex because they incorporated 
many variables. But the overall model behavior was 
essentially simple logistic growth: much of the apparent 
complexity did not add real insight. While the ecosystem 
models provide a note of caution, it is nevertheless the 
case that complex models can be built well.
Taking a broader view, Levermore noted that some 
conference speakers seemed to focus on avoiding systemic 
risk rather than managing the system. To evaluate risk 
quantitatively (a first step toward avoiding it, if that is indeed 
a realistic goal), one must be able to model the system to the 
point where it can be plausibly simulated. An example was 
Amin’s practice of testing various “islanding” schemes through 
simulation. Once that level of simulation capability is achieved, 
managing the system becomes easier. The primary benefit of 
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this modeling and simulation capability, then, might not lie in 
avoiding risk but in managing the economy more effectively. 
For example, if the capability could help craft a regulatory tool 
designed to manage risk, even if that tool could help the 
economy run only a fraction of a percent more efficiently, the 
benefit to society would be enormous, easily dwarfing any cost 
in developing such a capability. If this capability also helped us 
to avoid risk, it would be better still. 
This discussion is not meant to imply that ecology and 
engineering have overcome all the difficulties associated 
with representing and analyzing complex adaptive systems. 
Assessing the state of such systems is an ongoing challenge, 
as is determining precisely what to measure. The validation of 
models and verification of software remain major challenges. 
Computational problems—including how to decouple models 
into tractable components—are also a continuing source of 
concern. Amin pointed out that self-similar systems can be 
reduced, but complex systems such as the electric grid cannot. 
Researchers can use approximations to decouple complex 
systems, but it is difficult to analyze the errors thus introduced. 
In this regard, Amin noted that if one can find parts of an 
engineered system—and presumably parts of other systems—
that are weakly coupled in terms of the dynamics transferred 
through the system, then one can approximate those portions 
with standalone models. Such a strategy essentially reduces the 
complexity by dividing and conquering. These component 
models might assume a variety of forms: some might be 
empirical models fit to data, others might be physics-based or 
financial, and still others might include elements—such as 
human behavior and performance—that cannot be modeled. 
Haimes observed that, as an alternative strategy, one can 
decouple the system at the lower level, model the lower level 
components or subgrids, and then impose a higher level 
coordination. In some cases, this can even be done with an 
additional level of hierarchy. This type of decomposition is 
a very effective way of addressing complex systems. In either 
case, aggregating (composing) the outputs of these component 
models into an overall picture is very challenging. To model the 
electric grid, for example, researchers have parametrized some 
of the component models so as to provide input to the next 
level of modeling, using Bayesian analysis. Sensitivity analysis 
is used to validate the resulting models.
Amin emphasized the difficulty of identifying meaningful 
signals from complex systems. For example, when monitoring 
a large fraction of the U.S. electric grid, how can we discern 
whether a perturbation in the system is a natural fluctuation or 
a sign of catastrophic failure? Is it a naturally caused 
phenomenon, perhaps triggered by heat, high humidity, or 
strong demand in one portion of the grid, or is it actually an 
attack on the system or the precursor to a major disturbance? 
How close is it to a regime shift or system flip? These questions 
can be addressed only with detection systems that can call up all 
the data and perform data mining, pattern recognition, and 
statistical analysis to derive the probability that a catastrophic 
failure is either developing or occurring now.
This system-monitoring problem is exacerbated if the 
sharing of information is limited, as it is in the banking sector. 
Charles Taylor of the Risk Management Association asked 
Amin how one would monitor and control the reliability of the 
electric grid under the assumption that companies did not 
cooperate with each other but instead competed and did not 
share information. Amin said that such a situation would lead 
to a new control mechanism, and the logical question would be 
whether that mechanism would stabilize or destabilize the 
system. He pointed to a project undertaken by the Electric 
Power Research Institute in the late 1990s—the Simulator for 
Electric Power Industry Agents—which addressed such a case. 
The analysis, applied to four large regions of the United States, 
explored whether one could increase efficiency without 
diminishing reliability.11 This preliminary analysis would need 
to be carried out with more data and realism in order to reach 
a definitive conclusion. 
Levin identified particular challenges facing those who wish 
to understand systemic risk more fully. For instance, we would 
like to be able to develop structure-function relationships—
meaning that one could take a snapshot of a system and infer 
something about its dynamic state. We do not know how to 
anticipate the collapse of a system by looking at it and 
recognizing that something is not right. Are there ways to look 
at trends in the stock market and know when a collapse is 
coming? In the view of many observers, complex systems 
produce signals that will tell us when we are approaching a 
11See Amin (2002).
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precipice. But the unfolding of market disruptions is affected 
greatly by confidence, herding, and other behaviors that are not 
mirrored in risk assessments for complex engineered systems. 
Other questions include, How do we overcome the robustness 
of undesirable configurations, so as to make it easier to move 
out of them? How can we get systems out of potentially 
problematic settings, and how can we achieve desirable 
cooperative arrangements?
The tools are available to develop agent-based models 
of banking systems—models in which one builds in rules 
for the behavior of individual people or institutions. These 
models help us understand how individual behaviors become 
synchronized or integrated with one another and how they 
spread through the financial sector. Of course, there are many 
unknowns about these rules, and the gamesmanship and 
proactive moves probably figure more importantly in the 
financial sector than in ecology or engineered systems. This 
is just one set of tools, but there are others. Sugihara has 
developed an approach to nonlinear forecasting. John Doyle 
of the California Institute of Technology and Jean Carlson of 
the University of California at Santa Barbara have done work 
on highly optimized tolerance in which they use a genetic 
algorithm to evolve the properties of systems. They consider 
a variety of systems with particular structures and feedback 
properties, expose them to perturbations, observe their 
recovery, and then—in the same way that one might “train” 
a chess-playing program—modify these systems until they 
become more tolerant of the disturbances to which they are 
exposed. Doyle and Carlson’s strategy offers a way to improve 
the structure of systems when the mathematics cannot be 
solved. Nevertheless, as the authors themselves point out, their 
approach does have a drawback: Systems that are engineered or 
have evolved to be tolerant of a particular set of disturbances 
often do so at the expense of their response to other classes of 
disturbances. Such systems are at once robust and fragile—an 
outcome that policymakers and researchers might wish to 
guard against as they seek better ways to manage risk and avert 
systemic failures.12
12See, for example, Zhou, Carlson, and Doyle (2002) and Carlson and Doyle 
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